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51 European Central Bank Working Paper SeriesAbstract
Unstable government debt dynamics can typically be corrected by various
ﬁscal instruments, like appropriate adjustments in government spending, pub-
lic transfers, or taxes. This paper investigates properties of state-contingent
debt targeting rules which link stabilizing budgetary adjustments around a
target level of long-run debt to the state of the economy. The paper es-
tablishes that the size of steady-state debt is a key determinant of whether
it is possible to ﬁnd a rule of this type which can be implemented under all
available ﬁscal instruments. Speciﬁcally, considering linear feedback rules, the
paper demonstrates that there may well exist a critical level of debt beyond
which this is no longer possible. From an applied perspective, this ﬁnding is
of particular relevance in the context of a monetary union with decentralized
ﬁscal policies. Depending on the level of long-run debt, there might be a con-
ﬂict between a common ﬁscal framework which tracks deﬁcit developments as
a function of the state of the economy and the unrestricted choice of ﬁscal
policy instruments at the national level.
Keywords: Fiscal regimes, Overlapping generations
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: E63, H62.
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In European Monetary Union the principle of subsidiarity (as laid down in Article 5 of 
the Treaty or Article I-9 of the draft constitution) is of key importance for the 
distribution of responsibilities between the union and the national member states. 
According to this principle, the union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of 
the intended action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states. Applied to 
the field of fiscal policy this principle means that member states are responsible for 
their national and sub-national budgetary policies, subject to certain constraints of a 
common fiscal framework. Such constraints are needed to keep free-riding incentives 
at the national level in check. Without such constraints, an insufficient lack of fiscal 
discipline could undermine the smooth working of automatic fiscal stabilizers, lead to 
unstable government debt dynamics and ultimately result in conflicts with monetary 
policy. To avoid such outcomes, the common fiscal framework, which is implemented 
at the level of the union, monitors how broad fiscal indicators, like the deficits of 
member states, react to the state of the economy. Whenever corrective fiscal policy 
measures are needed, the framework respects, in principle, national preferences with 
respect to the implementation of such measures. In other words, in line with the 
subsidiarity principle, governments are free to correct imbalances by adjusting any 
revenue or expenditure component and to design their own fiscal policy reactions, 
provided that they are consistent with the broad requirements of the overall fiscal 
framework. 
     
Motivated by these features (which are qualitatively of importance for any monetary 
union with decentralized fiscal policies), this paper develops a simple dynamic 
general equilibrium model in which governments can choose between various fiscal 
instruments to achieve stable debt dynamics, subject, however, to the provisions of a 
rule-based common framework. The model analysis is rather stylized and the broad 
modelling assumptions maintained in this paper cannot capture many of the 
institutional details which characterize the particular arrangement of fiscal policies in 
EMU. Yet, the paper shows that a sufficiently low level of average debt facilitates the 
smooth functioning of any carefully balanced arrangement of this type. By contrast, at 
high levels of average debt conflicts may arise between the provisions of a common 
fiscal framework and the unrestricted choice of fiscal policy instruments at the 
national level. 
     
More specifically, the paper starts out with the observation that unstable government 
debt dynamics can normally be corrected by appropriate budgetary adjustments. 
Moreover, to achieve the needed corrections a government can typically adjust a 
broad range of fiscal instruments, like government spending, public transfers, or 
various taxes. Given this multiplicity of fiscal instruments, this paper develops the 
idea that there are two different ways to conceptualize state-contingent fiscal rules 
which stabilize government debt dynamics around a certain long-run level of debt. 
First, for a particular instrument one can think of rules which establish a link between 
stabilizing variations of the instrument and the state of the economy. For a particular 
specification of such a rule it is then possible to derive the implied sequence of 
budgetary adjustments. Second, one can think of broader rules which establish a link 
5
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contingent path of a particular instrument (or a combination of various instruments) 
or, alternatively, to condition the choice of the instrument on a particular state-
contingent path of budgetary adjustments depends on the context at hand. This paper 
argues that the second line of reasoning is particularly relevant for the design of fiscal 
rules in a monetary union with decentralized fiscal policies, in which the objectives 
are constrained by the common framework while the instruments are left to the choice 
of national governments. Specifically, it can be used to see that, depending on the 
target level of government debt, conflicts may arise between a common fiscal 
framework which imposes constraints on deficit developments and the unrestricted 
choice of fiscal policy instruments at the national level. 
     
To see intuitively, why a debt targeting rule, when expressed in terms of budgetary 
adjustments, may not always be implementable under all instruments consider, for 
simple illustration purposes, a government which can generate surpluses by reducing 
government expenditures or alternatively by raising wage income taxes. In a life-cycle 
framework one can well imagine that the second measure will decrease private sector 
savings, while the first measure may leave savings constant. Accordingly, for any 
given fiscal consolidation requirement, the crowding out of private sector investments 
is likely to be different under the two instruments, implying that the state of the 
economy is likely to evolve differently under the instruments. As a result, it is a priori 
not clear whether for a given specification of such a debt targeting rule its 
implementability under both instruments will be ensured. 
     
The paper shows that the answer to this question depends on the target level of debt 
around which the economy is stabilized. Considering a model economy with three 
distinct fiscal instruments (government consumption expenditures, transfer payments 
and a wage income tax), the key theoretical result of the paper states that the number 
of instruments which can be used to implement such a rule declines in the level of 
steady-state debt. Essentially, this result reflects that the model economy consists of 
two parts: the budget constraint of the government and a second part which 
summarizes all the remaining private sector activities in the economy. By 
construction, the source of instability is confined to the first part, while the 
instruments which can be used to achieve the required fiscal surpluses operate through 
different channels and have therefore different effects on private sector activities. The 
level of steady-state debt determines the relative importance of these effects within 
the set of intertemporal equilibrium conditions. Under a low level of steady-state debt, 
these effects carry low weights, making it possible that the debt targeting rule can be 
implemented with a common set of feedback coefficients under all three instruments. 
With high debt, however, the strength of these effects increases, and, as debt rises, the 
instrument-specific stabilization profiles become so diverse that the debt targeting rule 
can no longer be implemented under all three instruments. 
between budgetary adjustments and the state of the economy. This second reasoning 
leads to the question under which instruments a particular specification of such a rule 
can be implemented. 
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Unstable government debt dynamics can typically be corrected by appropriate bud-
getary adjustments. To achieve the needed corrections a government can normally
adjust a broad range of ﬁscal instruments, like government spending, public trans-
fers, or various taxes. Given the multiplicity of ﬁscal instruments, this paper builds
o nt h ei d e at h a tt h e r ea r et w od i ﬀerent ways to conceptualize state-contingent ﬁs-
cal rules which stabilize government debt dynamics around a certain long-run level
of debt. First, for a particular instrument one can think of rules which link the
use of this instrument to the state of the economy. Keeping the other instruments
constant, any such rule then implies a certain sequence of budgetary adjustments.
Alternatively, one can think of rules which, following the reverse logic, leave the
choice of the instrument a priori open and specify directly a state-contingent path
of budgetary adjustments. This second reasoning leads then to the question under
which of the available instruments a particular speciﬁcation of such a rule can be
implemented.
These two approaches, while algebraically being closely related, oﬀer diﬀerent in-
sights. This paper argues that the second approach is particularly relevant for the
design of ﬁscal rules in a monetary union with decentralized ﬁscal policies. Specif-
ically, the logic of the second approach can be used to see that, depending on the
target level of government debt, it may not be possible to ﬁnd a state-contingent
prescription of stabilizing budgetary adjustments that can be implemented under
all available instruments. In other words, the paper argues that, depending on the
target level of government debt, conﬂicts may arise between a common ﬁscal frame-
work which tracks deﬁcit developments as a function of the state of the economy
and the unrestricted choice of ﬁscal policy instruments at the national level.
To make this reasoning precise, this paper considers a small and fully tractable
model which distinguishes between three distinct ﬁscal instruments in the govern-
ment’s ﬂow budget constraint, namely government consumption, transfer payments
and a wage income tax. The analysis is based on a deterministic overlapping gener-
ations economy with government debt dynamics in the spirit of Diamond (1965). To
operationalize the notion of unstable government debt dynamics, the paper identiﬁes
steady states which are characterized by non-negative levels of government debt and
which are locally unstable under the assumption of a permanently balanced primary
budget. However, the economy can be stabilized at the corresponding steady-state
levels if one allows for appropriate budgetary adjustments. Such adjustments can be
brought about by any of the three instruments. For the sake of simple tractability,
the paper considers for each instrument a rule which sets the instrument as a linear
function of the two state variables of the model, physical capital and real govern-
ment bonds. For given feedback coeﬃcients associated with the two states of the
economy, any such rule, when combined with the linearized ﬂow budget constraint
7
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ear reaction of the primary balance to the two states of the economy. In sum, this
experiment leads to a broad class of debt targeting rules, deﬁned over the set of
admissible feedback coeﬃcients.
In line with the motivation of the opening paragraph, this class of debt targeting
rules can be investigated in two directions. First, we derive for each instrument
the range of instrument-speciﬁc feedback coeﬃcients which stabilize government
debt at the target value. When considered in isolation such ranges are shown to
exist for all instruments. Second, we follow the reverse logic and establish whether
there exists a debt targeting rule which can be implemented under all instruments
with common feedback coeﬃcients. This amounts to check whether the ranges
of stabilizing feedback coeﬃcients induced by the three instruments do overlap.
The paper shows that the answer to this question is not trivial and depends on
the level of long-run debt around which the economy is stabilized. Speciﬁcally,
the key theoretical results of the paper state that at a zero level of steady-state
debt there always exists a debt targeting rule which can be implemented under all
three instruments with common feedback coeﬃcients. As the level of steady-state
debt rises, however, the instrument-speciﬁc adjustment paths become increasingly
diverse. As we show, this feature implies that there may well exist a critical long-
run level of debt beyond which there exists no longer a debt targeting rule that is
implementable under all three instruments with common feedback coeﬃcients.
The novelty of these results can be assessed from diﬀerent angles. First, the re-
sults relate to the literature on ﬁscal closure rules, as typically used in large scale
macroeconomic models. In this literature it is widely understood that diﬀerent in-
struments, when residually used to enforce the intertemporal budget constraint of
the government, lead to diﬀerent dynamic outcomes which preclude simple compar-
isons across simulations, as discussed in Bryant and Zhang (1996), Mitchell et al.
(2000), and Pérez and Hiebert (2002). Yet, by construction, this literature oﬀers
few explicit analytical ﬁndings and we are not aware of a systematic discussion of
the role of government debt in this context.
Turning to tractable small scale models, stability features of Diamond-models have
been discussed in a number of studies, but typically not with the intention to com-
pare between the stabilization properties of diﬀerent ﬁscal instruments.1 More
1For a detailed discussion of dynamic equilibria in Diamond-models with production, but with-
out government debt, see Galor and Ryder (1989). For comprehensive surveys of the dynamics
with debt and with zero (and, more generally, constant) primary deﬁcits, see Azariadis (1993), and
de la Croix and Michel (2002). Special features of constant deﬁcit rules are discussed by Farmer
(1986), with a focus on cyclical adjustment patterns, and Chalk (2000), with a focus on sustain-
ability issues. For a comparison of adjustment dynamics under a balanced primary budget and
a time-varying unbalanced budget, stressing labour market aspects, see Kaas and von Thadden
(2004). For further discussions of ﬁscal rules in overlapping generations models, see Marin (2002),
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and Harrison (2004), and Giannitsarou (2004), all considering Ramsey economies
with inﬁnitely lived agents, show that for a given ﬁscal rule (in their context: a
balanced-budget rule) equilibria can be locally unique or indeterminate, depending
on whether budget balance is achieved by distortionary income taxes, consumption
taxes or government spending adjustments. Our paper shares with these papers
the descriptive nature of the ﬁscal rule, but our focus is not on balanced budget
dynamics and the role of debt is substantially diﬀerent.2
Implementation issues of ﬁscal policy have also been addressed in a large number
of papers which explicitly solve for optimal ﬁscal (and monetary) policies from the
perspective of Ramsey economies.3 In such modelling environments, however, there
is little conceptual agreement about the optimal target level of long-run debt it-
self.4 Reﬂecting this feature, recent studies by Kollmann (2004), Lambertini (2004)
and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), for example, consider only a restricted set
of optimal policies, in the sense that the long-run level of debt around which the
optimization takes place is pre-speciﬁed. By contrast, the long-run target levels of
government debt analyzed in our overlapping generations structure have a simple
normative foundation because of dynamic eﬃciency considerations.5
Why may it not always be possible in our set-up to ﬁnd a state-contingent prescrip-
tion of stabilizing budgetary adjustments that can be implemented under all avail-
able instruments? Intuitively, this ﬁnding reﬂects that the model economy consists
of two parts: the budget constraint of the government and a block which summa-
rizes all the remaining private sector activities in the economy. By construction,
t h es o u r c eo fi n s t a b i l i t yi sc o n ﬁned to the ﬁrst part, while the instruments which
can be used to achieve the required budgetary adjustments aﬀect the second part
Annicchiarico and Giammarioli (2004) and Fernandez Huertas-Moraga and Vidal (2004).
2Related to this literature, see also the dynamic analysis of tax changes in Judd (1987),
Turnovsky (1990) and Mankiw and Weinzierl (2004). However, these papers do not explicitly
focus on the stabilization properties of diﬀerent ﬁscal instruments, but rather compare between
short- and long-run features of equilibria which are characterized by diﬀerent tax structures.
3This literature goes back to Lucas and Stokey (1983). For recent authoritative treatments,
see, in particular, Chari and Kehoe (1999) and Benigno and Woodford (2003).
4In the framework of Aiyagari et al. (2002) the optimal long-run level of government debt
is shown to be negative because of the non-distortionary nature of the interest income that a
government receives in such a constellation. Beneﬁts of positive government debt, like the loosening
of private sector borrowing constraints because of an enhanced liquidity position, are discussed in
Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998). Costs and beneﬁts of long-run debt levels are also discussed in
Martin (2004), with a focus on time consistency issues in the presence of non-indexed government
debt. Similarly, see Díaz-Giménez et al. (2004).
5We do not optimize over the feedback coeﬃcients in the debt targeting rule. The studies by
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe as well as by Kollmann show that simple feedback rules may well have
welfare properties similar to those one obtains from fully optimizing programs. Whether a similar
claim can be made in this context for overlapping generations economies needs to be investigated.
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portance of these margins within the set of intertemporal equilibrium conditions. At
a zero level of steady-state debt, these margins carry zero weights, ensuring thereby
that there always exists a debt targeting rule which can be implemented under all
three instruments. For positive and rising levels of steady-state debt, however, these
margins gain importance, implying that for any particular debt targeting rule the
instrument-speciﬁcs t a b i l i z a t i o np r o ﬁles become increasingly distinct. Exploiting
this feature, we show that there may well exist a critical debt level beyond which it
is no longer possible to ﬁnd a debt targeting rule that can be implemented under
all three instruments.
We think that one particularly interesting application of our results is given by mon-
etary unions in which member states remain responsible for their national budgetary
policies, subject to the provisions of a common ﬁscal framework that are needed to
keep free-riding incentives at the national level in check. The European Monetary
Union is a good example for this since the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact
constitute a rule-based ﬁscal framework that sets certain limits to deﬁcits and debt
levels and strengthens multilateral budgetary surveillance.6 Moreover, whenever
corrective ﬁscal policy measures are needed the framework respects, in principle,
national preferences with respect to the implementation of such measures, in line
with the subsidiarity principle.7 Evidently, the broad modelling assumptions main-
tained in this paper cannot fully capture further institutional details which charac-
terize this particular arrangement. Yet, the analysis of this paper clearly indicates
that a suﬃciently low level of average debt facilitates the smooth functioning of any
carefully balanced arrangement of this type.
The paper is organized as follows. As a particularly tractable starting point, Section
2 presents a Diamond-type overlapping generations model with an exogenous labour
supply, enriched with a government sector and public debt. The model allows for
three ﬁscal instruments, namely government consumption, lump-sum taxes levied
on young agents and lump-sum transfers to old agents. Section 3 introduces the
notion of the debt targeting rule and derives the main results of the paper. Section
4 establishes the robustness of the main results of Section 3 along two dimensions.
6The main arguments for ﬁscal rules are: i) dynamic time inconsistency issues of (ﬁscal) policy-
making, similar to that of politically dependent central banks; ii) irrationality of voters triggering
political business cycles (myopic behaviour or ﬁscal illusion); iii) political polarization and strategic
considerations of parties alternating in oﬃce and attempting to bind the hands of their successors;
iv) common-pool problems and strategic interactions speciﬁc to monetary unions. For a recent
review of theoretical arguments in favour of a rule-based ﬁscal framework in a monetary union,
see Calmfors (2005). See also for further references on this widely studied topic Chari and Kehoe
(2004), Fatás et al. (2003), and Uhlig (2002).
7According to the subsidiarity principle, as laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty (and Article I-9
of the draft Constitution), the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the intended
action cannot be suﬃciently achieved by the Member States.
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longer expressed in terms of state-contingent adjustments of the primary balance,
but imposes instead state-contingent restrictions on the path of the overall deﬁcit
or, alternatively, on the path of newly emitted debt. Second, at the expense of
more tedious algebra, we allow for an endogenous labour supply and distortionary
income taxation. This modiﬁcation, while mitigating some of the eﬀects, does not
change qualitatively any of our results. Section 5 oﬀers conclusions. Proofs and
some technical issues are delegated to two Appendices at the end of the paper.
2 The model with exogenous labour supply
For simple tractability the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e ri sb a s e do nav e r s i o no faD i a m o n d -
type overlapping generations economy with exogenous labour supply and lump-sum
taxes and transfers.
Problem of the representative agent
In period t, the economy is populated by a large number Nt of young agents and
Nt−1 of old agents. Each agent lives for two period and has a time-invariant, ﬁxed
labour supply l =1when being young and a zero labour supply when being old.
The population grows at the constant rate n>0, i.e. Nt =( 1+n) · Nt−1. Let
preferences of the representative agent born in period t be given by
U(ct,d t+1),
where ct and dt+1 denote ﬁrst-period and second-period consumption, respectively.
(A 1) The function U(c, d) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increas-
ing, strictly quasi-concave and satisﬁes for all c, d>0, limc→0 Uc(c,d) →∞and
limd→0 Ud(c,d) →∞ .
In any period t, agents take the wage rate (wt) and the return factor Rt+1 on savings
(st) as given. There exists a tax-transfer-system such that young agents pay lump-
sum taxes ηt > 0, while they receive lump-sum transfers θt+1 when being old.8 This
leads to the pair of budget constraints
wt − ηt = ct + st
dt+1 = Rt+1st + θt+1,
which can be used to rewrite the objective as:
U(wt − ηt − st,R t+1st + θt+1).
8We do not make any explicit sign restrictions regarding the second-period lump-sum payment
θt+1. Strictly speaking, the term ‘tax-transfer’-system would refer only to a scenario with θt+1 > 0.
11
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 576
January 2006The optimal choice of savings is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
U1 = Rt+1U2.
To characterize the savings decision of agents we refer to the well-investigated Dia-
mond model without second-period transfers (i.e. θt+1 =0 )and assume w − η>0.
Then, according to (A 1), there exists the savings function
s(w − η,R)=a r gm a xU(w − η − s,Rs), (1)
with s(w−η,R):R++× R++ → R++ being continuously diﬀerentiable. In order to
extend (1) to a situation with θt+1 6=0it is assumed that the present value of the
income of agents is positive, i.e. w − η + θ
R > 0. Then, savings will be given by







and st satisﬁes −
θt+1
Rt+1 <s t <w t − ηt, ensuring non-negative consumption in both
periods.9 Finally, to impose further structure on the function s(w,R),w em a k et h e
customary assumption:
(A 2) Consider U(c, d) and assume that consumption goods are normal and gross
substitutes. Then, 0 <s w < 1 and sR ≥ 0.
Production
It is assumed that there exists a larger number of competitive ﬁrms with access to
a standard neoclassical technology F(Kt,L t), where K and L denote the aggregate
levels of physical capital and labour, respectively.
(A 3) The function F(K,L):R++× R++ → R++ is positive valued, twice continu-
ously diﬀerentiable, homogenous of degree 1, increasing and satisﬁes FKK(K,L) < 0.
Firms are price takers in input and output markets. In a competitive equilibrium,
labour market clearing requires Lt = Nt.L e tkt = Kt/Nt denote the capital stock
per young agent, giving rise to the familiar pair of ﬁrst-order conditions
Rt =1 − δ + FK(kt,1) = R(kt) (2)
wt = FL(kt,1) = w(kt), (3)
with δ denoting the depreciation rate on capital. According to (2) and (3), the
equilibrium return rates of the two production factors depend only on the equi-
librium capital intensity and change along the factor price frontier with R0(kt)=
FKK(kt,1) < 0 and w0(kt)=FLK(kt,1) > 0.
9For a more detailed discussion of the savings problem under second-period lump-sum payments,
see de la Croix and Michel p. 130 f.
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In the representative period t, the government consumes an amount Gt of aggregate
output which does not aﬀect the utility of consumers.10 Let
Πt = Ntηt − Nt−1θt − Gt
denote the aggregate primary surplus. In intensive form this reads as




where gt and πt denote government consumption and the primary surplus per young
individual, respectively. It is assumed that agents perceive investments in physical
capital and government bonds (in real terms) as perfect substitutes with identical
return factor Rt. Then, the ﬂow budget constraint of the government, expressed per
young agent, reads as
(1 + n)bt+1 = R(kt)bt − πt.
Intertemporal equilibrium conditions
In sum, we obtain a version of the intertemporal equilibrium conditions of the
Diamond-model, modiﬁed for the existence of a simple tax-transfer system and the
possibility of a primary balance that does not have to be balanced in every period







(1 + n)bt+1 = R(kt)bt − πt (5)





In each period t, the state of the economy is summarized by the pair (bt, kt), denoting
the beginning-of-period per capita values of the capital stock and of real government
bond holdings which are predetermined by past investment decisions undertaken in
period t − 1. Hence, when we subsequently classify the dynamic behaviour of the
system (4)-(6) under various ﬁscal closures, it is natural to assume that dynamics
are characterized by two initial conditions, b0 and k0.11
10If publicly provided public goods enter the utility of the representative consumer in an addi-
tively separable manner, they do not aﬀect the consumer’s saving decision. Our analysis would
still hold under this assumption.
11Note, however, that there is also a branch of the literature which stresses the role of bubbles
in closely related models and treats real government debt as a jumping variable, see Tirole (1985).
More recently, the treatment of real government debt as a jumping variable plays also a key role
in the logic of the ﬁscal theory of the price level, as summarized, for example, in Woodford (2001).
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The equations (4)-(6), without further restrictions, allow for a rich set of dynamic
equilibria. In the remainder of this paper, however, we focus on the local stability
behaviour of the system around steady states which have the particular feature of
a balanced primary budget (i.e. π =0 ) . Moreover, to set the stage for a meaning-
ful discussion of stabilizing oﬀ-steady-state adjustments in the primary balance in
Section 3, we establish benchmark steady states of (4)-(6) which, assuming b0 6= b
and k0 6= k, are locally unstable if the primary budget is permanently balanced,
i.e. if πt ≡ 0 for all t.S p e c i ﬁcally, consider a stationary tax-transfer system with
g ≡ η − θ
1+n > 0, leading to the two-dimensional dynamic system in kt and bt







(1 + n)bt+1 = R(kt)bt. (8)
Using a ﬁrst-order approximation, dynamics around steady states of (7) and (8)
evolve according to
A1 · dkt+1 +( 1+n) · dbt+1 = A2 · dkt (9)
(1 + n) · dbt+1 = R
0(k)b · dkt + R(k) · dbt, with: (10)
A1 =1 + n − R




0(k) > 0 (12)
Existence and stability conditions of steady states of (7) and (8) have been widely
discussed in the literature. In particular, under mild assumptions the system is
associated with two distinct types of steady states which are unstable under a per-
manently balanced primary budget: i) steady states with zero debt and underaccu-
mulation (k>0,b=0 ,R (k) > 1+n) and ii) golden rule steady states with positive
debt (k>0,b gr > 0,R (k)=1+n). To this end, we make the assumption
(A 4) There exist steady states of (7) and (8) with k>0 and b ≥ 0, satisfying
A2 <A 1.
Remark: Assumption (A 4) is not very restrictive. For illustration, assume ﬁrst
g = η = θ =0 . Then, if assumptions (A 1)-(A 3) are satisﬁed and, for example,
the aggregate production function is of Cobb-Douglas type, there exists a unique
steady state with k>0 and b =0 , satisfying A2 <A 1.12 Moreover, if at this steady
12If the production function is of the more general CES-type this reasoning extends to the case
of an elasticity of substitution larger than one. If the elasticity is less than one, there are zero or
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R(k)=1+n, also satisfying A2 <A 1. If g = η>0 and θ =0 , this reasoning can be
extended as long as g is smaller than some positive bound g. Finally, by continuity,
if g ≡ η − θ
1+n > 0 and θ 6=0 , such steady states continue to exist as long as θ is
suﬃciently small.13
From a normative perspective, the two mentioned steady-state types are relevant
benchmarks because of dynamic eﬃciency considerations. For further reference, we
conclude this section with a brief discussion of why these steady states are locally
unstable. In general, according to the linearized system (9)-(10), dynamics without
government debt dynamics are stable if A2 <A 1, as ensured by (A 4). In the
presence of government debt dynamics, however, instability can occur because of
two partial eﬀects. First, assuming a constant interest rate (R0(k)=0 ), interest
payments induce a snowball eﬀect on debt,a n dt h i se ﬀect is unstable whenever
the interest rate is higher than the (population) growth rate of the economy, i.e.
whenever R(k) > 1+n. Second, out of steady state the interest rate does not stay
constant in an economy with capital stock dynamics, implying that, for any initial
level of debt, there is an additional eﬀe c to nd e b ta c c o r d i n gt oR0(k)b · dkt.A n y
crowding out of capital leads over time to a higher interest rate which reinforces
debt dynamics. We call this second channel the interest rate eﬀect on debt.
Benchmark 1: Underaccumulation steady state (k>0,b=0 ,R (k) > 1+n)
Since b =0 , t h ei n t e r e s tr a t ee ﬀect on debt in the linearized dynamics is zero and the
instability is entirely caused by the snowball eﬀect. Because of the absence of the
interest rate eﬀect, government debt dynamics are independent of (9) and it is easy
to verify that the two eigenvalues of (9) and (10) are given by λ1 = A2/A1 ∈ (0,1),
and λ2 = R(k)/1+n>1. This pattern of eigenvalues implies that, for initial values
k0 6= k and b0 6=0close to the steady state, dynamics are locally unstable under a
balanced primary budget rule.
Benchmark 2: Golden rule steady state (k>0,b gr > 0,R (k)=1+n)
At the golden rule steady state with positive debt, the snowball eﬀect is associated
with a unit root, and strict instability is ensured by the additionally operating
interest rate eﬀect on debt. This can be veriﬁed from the characteristic polynomial
associated with (9) and (10), evaluated at the golden rule steady state:
p(λ)=λ










13For a detailed discussion of the existence and stability of dynamic equilibria in Diamond-models
with zero primary deﬁcits, see the references quoted in footnote 1. Speciﬁcally, de la Croix and
Michel (2002) focus in detail on aspects of lump-sum tax and transfer systems, see p. 195 ﬀ.
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Hence, at the golden rule steady state with bgr > 0 dynamics are locally unstable
under a balanced primary budget rule.
3 Stability under a debt targeting rule: a com-
mon framework with three instruments
Compared with the analysis of the previous section, we now allow for adjustments
in the primary balance with the idea to stabilize the benchmark steady states, i.e.
πt 6=0is admitted for the oﬀ-steady-state dynamics. For a generic discussion of
such stabilizing adjustments it seems natural to think of state-contingent ﬁscal rules
which link the variations in πt to deviations of the two state variables bt and kt from
their steady-state values, as given by
πt = π(kt − k,bt − b), with: π(0,0) = 0.
In combination with the budget constraint of the government, appropriate rules of
this type give rise to the expression
(1 + n) · bt+1 = R(kt)bt − π(kt − k,bt − b), (13)
which, in contrast to the budget identity (5), describes a generic debt targeting rule
which aims to stabilize the economy at the benchmark steady states. To opera-
t i o n a l i z e( 1 3 ) ,t h eu s eo fa tl e a s to n eo ft h et h r e ei n s t r u m e n t sn e e d st ob el i n k e dt o
the states of the economy. In the following, we distinguish between three scenarios
in which adjustments are achieved by variations of one of the three available ﬁscal
instruments gt,η t or θt+1, while holding the other two instruments constant at their
steady-state values.
For simplicity, we assume in all scenarios that the instruments are set as a linear
function of the states. According to (6), this implies that the primary surplus πt
will also be linear in the two states.14 Hence, (13) can be written as
(1 + n) · bt+1 = R(kt)bt − πk(kt − k) − πb(bt − b), (14)
where (14) describes a broad class of debt targeting rules, parametrized by the pair
of linear feedback coeﬃcients πk and πb. For further reference, we summarize brieﬂy
these three scenarios, all of them being consistent with (14).
14In the generalized version of the model in Section 4.2.,t a xr e v e n u e sηt are no longer lump sum,
but the product of a tax rate and the tax base which itself depends on the states of the economy.
Then, assuming a linear instrument rule, the coeﬃcients πk and πb summarize the induced reaction
of the primary surplus in the linearized budget dynamics.
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Assume the government satisﬁes (14) by adjusting government spending, according
to gt−g = −πt.15 Then, the intertemporal equilibrium conditions can be summarized
as







(1 + n) · bt+1 = R(kt)bt − πk(kt − k) − πb(bt − b) (16)
gt = e g(kt,b t)=g − πk(kt − k) − πb(bt − b) (17)
Importantly, adjustments in the primary balance via variations in gt do not aﬀect
the accumulation equation, i.e. (15) is identical to (4). In other words, variations
in gt oﬀer a particularly convenient, non-distortionary channel to stabilize the two-
dimensional benchmark system (7)-(8). Since (17) does not feed back into the ﬁrst
equation the linearized dynamics read as
A1 · dkt+1 +( 1+n) · dbt+1 = A2 · dkt (18)
(1 + n) · dbt+1 =( R
0(k)b − πk) · dkt +( R(k) − πb) · dbt (19)
Instrument 2:Variations in lump-sum taxes ηt
We assume now, alternatively, that the government satisﬁes (14) by adjusting ﬁrst-
period lump-sum taxes such that ηt − η = πt. Then, the intertemporal equilibrium
evolves according to







(1 + n)bt+1 = R(kt)bt − πk(kt − k) − πb(bt − b) (21)
ηt = e η(kt,b t)=η + πk(kt − k)+πb(bt − b)
Again, dynamics are two-dimensional in kt and bt but adjustments in the primary
balance via variations in ηt do aﬀect the disposable income of young agents and,
hence, the accumulation equation. Linearization of (20)-(21) yields
A1 · dkt+1 +( 1+n) · dbt+1 =( A2 − swπk) · dkt − swπb · dbt (22)
(1 + n) · dbt+1 =( R
0(k)b − πk) · dkt +( R(k) − πb) · dbt, (23)
where the link between the instrument and the accumulation equation is captured
by the use of the partial derivatives e ηk = πk and e ηb = πb.
15Primary surpluses require gt <g .Recall the assumption of g>0. I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w ea s s u m e
that g is suﬃciently positive such that for the local dynamics around the steady state the inequality
gt > 0 is always satisﬁed.
17
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 576
January 2006Instrument 3:Variations in transfers θt+1
Finally, we consider the case where the government satisﬁes (14) by adjusting second-
period transfers such that θt+1 − θ = −(1 + n)πt+1. Then, the intertemporal equi-
librium conditions are given by







(1 + n) · bt+1 = R(kt)bt − πk(kt − k) − πb(bt − b) (25)
θt+1 = e θ(kt+1,b t+1)=θ − (1 + n) · [πk(kt+1 − k)+πb(bt+1 − b)]
Variations in θt+1 aﬀect the second-period disposable income of agents and, hence,








πb]·dbt+1 = A2·dkt (26)
(1 + n) · dbt+1 =( R
0(k)b − πk) · dkt +( R(k) − πb) · dbt, (27)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e de θk = −(1 + n)πk and e θb = −(1 + n)πb.
In line with the motivation of the introduction, these three scenarios can be inves-
tigated in two directions. First, for any of the two benchmark steady states it is
possible to derive three instrument-speciﬁc sets of feedback coeﬃcients πk and πb
which ensure locally stable dynamics. A simple geometric representation of these
sets can be achieved if one recognizes that for each instrument the linearized local
dynamics around any steady state are two-dimensional in kt and bt, giving rise to
characteristic polynomials p(λ)i,i= g,η,θ, and that stability requires
p(1)|i > 0,p (−1)|i > 0,p (0)|i < 1, with: i = g,η,θ.
As illustrated below, for each instrument these constraints (at equality) have at any
steady state a linear representation in πb − πk−space, giving rise to instrument-
speciﬁc stability regions. Intuitively, it is clear that these three regions are not
identical, since variations in gt leave the intertemporal accumulation equation (15)
unaﬀected, while variations in ηt and θt+1 aﬀect this equation through diﬀerent
margins, as to be inferred from (20) and (24).
Second, it can be investigated whether there exists a particular debt targeting rule,
characterized by a particular pair of πk and πb, which can be implemented under
all instruments. This amounts to check whether the regions of stabilizing feedback
coeﬃcients associated with the three instruments do overlap. Whenever this is the
case such a debt targeting rule may be considered as the basis of a common ﬁscal
18
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stabilization issues and the unrestricted choice of ﬁscal instruments. As shown in
the following two subsections, such a common framework may not always exist,
depending on the characteristics of the particular steady state under consideration.
3.1 Underaccumulation steady states
This subsection shows that underaccumulation steady states, as derived in Section
2, have the particular feature that, without imposing further restrictions, all three
instrument-speciﬁcs e t so fs t a b i l i z i n gf e e d b a c kc o e ﬃcients have a common intersec-
tion. This feature is directly linked to the absence of the interest rate eﬀect on debt
at this steady state, i.e. since b =0any deviation of the capital stock from its
steady-state value does not have by itself destabilizing eﬀects on government debt
dynamics. In other words, the instability of debt dynamics comes entirely from the
snowball eﬀect which can be fully corrected by an appropriate choice of πb.A c c o r d -
ingly, for all three instruments, if the debt targeting rule is characterized by πk =0
government debt dynamics are independent of the accumulation equation and for
all three linearized dynamic systems the two eigenvalues are identically given by




as one can directly infer from the three systems (18) and (19), (22) and (23), and
(26) and (27), respectively. Evidently, if πk =0and πb ∈ (R(k) − (1 + n),R (k)+
1+n) dynamics will be locally stable under all three instruments. Moreover, if
one considers the subset characterized by πk =0and πb ∈ (R(k) − (1 + n),R (k))
dynamics will not only be locally stable but also exhibit monotone adjustment for
all three instruments. This reasoning leads to
Proposition 1 Consider the three instrument-speciﬁc sets of feedback coeﬃcients
πk and πb which ensure local stability at the underaccumulation steady state under
the debt targeting rule (14). These three sets have a joint intersection, i.e. there
exist values for πk and πb such that the debt targeting rule can be implemented under
all three instruments with a common set of feedback coeﬃcients. Moreover, for some
values in the joint intersection local adjustment dynamics are monotone under all
three instruments.
Proposition 1 is not conﬁned, however, to the special assumption of πk =0 . Gen-
erally speaking, whenever πk 6=0this creates a policy-induced interdependence
between capital stock dynamics and government debt dynamics. This interdepen-
dence diﬀers between the three instruments. Yet, a debt targeting rule with πk 6=0
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this we turn now to a more detailed discussion of the instrument-speciﬁc stability
regions and consider for illustration
Example 1: F(K,L)=zKαL1−α,U (c, d)=φlnc + β lnd
δ =1 ,z=1 5 ,α=0 .4,φ=1 ,β=0 .5 (i.e. sw = β/(φ + β)=1 /3),η= −θ =2 .91,
g =4 .1, 1+n =2 .43. Assuming a period length of 30 years, this implies an annual
p o p u l a t i o ng r o w t ho f0.03. Assuming b =0 , one obtains R =6 .29 which corresponds
to an annual real interest rate of 0.06, consistent with an underaccumulation steady
state, i.e. R(k) > 1+n.M o r e o v e r ,k =0 .92,y=1 4 .53, where y denotes per capita
output, leading to g/y =0 .28,η / y=0 .2,θ / y= −0.2, i.e. agents have a similar
steady-state tax burden in both periods, measured in terms of per capita output.
It is instructive to discuss ﬁrst in some detail the stabilizing variations in government
spending gt because of their non-distortionary character. Illustrating Example 1,
Figure 1a plots the stability region in πb − πk−space for adjustments in gt. Points
inside the triangle in bold line are associated with two stable eigenvalues. The ﬁrst
dynamic benchmark of a permanently balanced primary budget discussed in the
previous section has coordinates πb = πk =0and lies, by construction, outside
the stability triangle. The triangle reﬂects that there are potentially two margins
for stabilizing adjustments of the primary balance, πb and πk, which can be used in
isolation or in combination. To further understand the shape of the triangle depicted
in Figure 1a it is important to realize that there is one key diﬀerence between these
two channels. Speciﬁcally, in the vicinity of any underaccumulation steady state
with k0 6= k and b0 6=0 , only debt imbalances, because of the snowball eﬀect,
destabilize on impact government debt dynamics, and consolidations according to
πb react immediately to this instability. By contrast, consolidations according to
πk respond with the delay of one period to the snowball eﬀect and only to the
extent that it leads to the crowding out of capital. Because of the diﬀerent timing
of the reactions under the two channels, stabilization can always be achieved if the
primary surplus exclusively reacts to the debt imbalance, i.e. if πk =0local stability
is ensured if πb ∈ (R(k)−(1+n),R (k)+1+n)). By contrast, if the primary surplus
exclusively reacts to the capital stock imbalance stabilization may not be possible,
i.e. if πb =0t h e r em a yn o te x i s tar a n g ef o rπk such that local stability is ensured,
as illustrated in Figure 1a.16 Hence, the eﬀectiveness of the two ﬁscal feedback
16However, this ﬁnding depends on the strength of the snowball eﬀect. To further illustrate
this, consider example 1 and assume, everything else being equal, α =1 /3. Because of the higher
wage income share this induces, ceteris paribus, higher savings and at b =0a lower return factor
R =4 .35, implying an annual real interest rate of 0.05, i.e. the snowball eﬀect will be smaller than
in example 1. Then, R − A1/A2(1 + n) < 0, and full stabilization can be achieved if πb =0and
if πk takes on appropriate negative values. Apart from the leftward shift of the stability triangle,
however, the features of Figure 1a remain qualitatively unchanged.
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that, from a stabilization perspective, imbalances should be addressed directly at
their source rather than indirectly and with some delay.
In any case, there exists a wide range of combinations of the two feedbacks which
are consistent with locally stable dynamics. In particular, assume that πb <R (k)−
(1+n), i.e. there is no fully stabilizing direct reaction via πb to the snowball eﬀect.
Then, if πk is suﬃciently negative (i.e. there is a suﬃcient reaction to the crowding
out of capital) overall dynamics may nevertheless be stable. Conversely, assume
that πb >R (k)+( 1+n), i.e. the direct reaction to debt imbalances overshoots
and risks destabilizing ﬂuctuations. Then, it may nevertheless be possible to have
overall stable dynamics if πk is suﬃciently positive.
In general, stable pairs of feedback coeﬃcients inside the stability triangle of Figure
1a are associated with a wide range of possible adjustment patterns. In partic-
ular, the area to the southwest of the hyperbola is associated with endogenously
ﬂuctuating adjustment dynamics because of complex eigenvalues. Note that only
points within the small, shaded triangle ABD are associated with two stable and
positive eigenvalues, ensuring monotone adjustment dynamics. Moreover, Figure
1a indicates that the combination of πb and πk associated with the highest speed
of adjustment (λ1 = λ2 =0 ) , denoted by the point B, requires reactions along
both margins. One easily veriﬁes in (18) and (19) that the point B has coordinates
πb = R(k) and πk = −A2. Intuitively, to fully oﬀset any initial deviation from the
steady-state values, the response of the primary balance should not only neutralize
the debt imbalance (πb = R(k)), but also fully correct for the disturbed savings
behaviour of young agents (πk = −A2). More generally, the location of B indicates
that for any given stabilizing direct reaction to debt imbalances, measured in terms
of πb, variations in πk lead to diﬀerent speeds of adjustments of the system. This is
illustrated in Figure 1b which plots the impulse response of the system to an initial
constellation b0 > 0 and k0 <kfor πb = R(k) and three distinct values of πk :
i) πk = −A2 (maximum speed of adjustment at point B, implying λ1 = λ2 =0 );
ii) πk =0(intermediate speed of adjustment at point C which, by construction,
corresponds in terms of kt to the Diamond model without debt dynamics and has
λ1 =0and λ2 = A2/A1 ∈ (0,1)); iii) πk = A1 − A2 − ε (slow speed of adjustment
at a point close to D with λ1 =0and λ2 =1− ε/A1, i.e. by choosing some small
ε>0 the second root can be made arbitrarily close to unity and Figure 1b uses for
illustration ε =0 .1).17
Finally, Figure 1c completes the illustration of Example 1 and includes also the
stability regions for the other two instruments which distort the accumulation equa-
tion. It is worth pointing out that for small values of πb the area corresponding
17The initial conditions are such that k0 is by 1% smaller than the steady state value of k. Since
b =0 ,b 0 is set somewhat arbitrarily at the level b0 =0 .05 > 0.
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balance to capital stock imbalances. Intuitively, this is the case since the disposable
income of young agents depends negatively on ﬁrst-period tax payments ηt. Hence,
if the ﬁscal rule attempts to stabilize the unstable snowball eﬀect, at least partly,
via responses to capital stock imbalances this introduces not only a costly delay, but
it also diminishes the disposable income of young agents and, hence, savings which
are needed in the ﬁrst place to support higher investments. Because of this eﬀect,
there is less scope to substitute delayed reactions via πk for direct reactions via πb
than under non-distortionary variations of gt.
By contrast, if the ﬁscal adjustment is instead achieved via reduced second-period
transfers θt+1 the same mechanism works in the opposite direction since this en-
courages savings. Consequently, for small values of πb the stability region associated
with variations in θt+1, is much wider than the one associated with both gt and ηt.
More speciﬁcally, as one infers from Figure 1c, the stability region associated with
variations in θt+1 is not bounded from below. This reﬂects that under this regime
debt-stabilizing ﬁscal measures lead to higher savings, reinforcing thereby the overall
stability of the system.
In sum, Figure 1c illustrates that the three instrument-speciﬁc stability regions,
while having a common intersection, also have a clear idiosyncratic component.
Speciﬁcally, acting as a counterpart to the existence of a common intersection, one
can show that for each instrument there exists in general (i.e. beyond the particular
functional forms used in the example) a stability region which does not lead to
stability under the other two instruments.
Proposition 2 For each of the three instruments there exist stabilizing feedback
coeﬃcients πk and πb which lie outside the stability regions of the other two instru-
ments.
Proof: see Appendix 1.
As the following subsection shows, at steady states with positive debt (b>0)t h i s
idiosyncratic component may become the dominating force, precluding the existence
of a common intersection of the three instrument-speciﬁc stability regions.
3.2 Golden rule steady states
Let us now assume that savings in this economy are suﬃciently high such that the
economy can settle down at a golden rule steady state with a lower interest rate
(such that R(k)=1+n) and a positive debt level, satisfying
s(w − η + θ
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propensity to save out of current wage income because of diﬀerences in preferences)
o rt h er e s p o n s et od i ﬀerent government policies (like lower transfer payments in the
second period).
As discussed in Section 2 for the special case of a permanently balanced primary
budget, at the golden rule steady state with bgr > 0 the interest rate eﬀect on debt
is a key margin of instability. This subsection shows that it is precisely this margin
which makes it diﬃcult to ﬁnd for such steady states a debt targeting rule that can
be implemented under all three instruments. The weight of this margin rises in the
level of debt, leading to increasingly distinct stabilization proﬁl e su n d e rt h et h r e e
instruments. Hence, the implementability problem (which requires a common set of
feedback coeﬃcients) becomes increasingly severe as the level of debt rises.
Generally speaking, the presence of the interest rate eﬀect on debt gives rise to
two distinct features. First, it is impossible to address this instability directly by
means of adjustments via πk and, at the same time, to maintain a recursive dynamic
structure which insulates the accumulation equation of the Diamond-model under all
three instruments against the stabilization of debt dynamics. Second, to address this
instability indirectly through adjustments via πb comes with a delay and, depending
on the strength of the interest rate eﬀect on debt, this delay can be costly in terms
of destabilizing dynamics. In combination, these two features give rise to the general
result:
Proposition 3 Consider the three instrument-speciﬁc sets of feedback coeﬃcients
πk and πb which ensure under the debt targeting rule (14) local stability at the golden
rule steady state. These three sets do not necessarily have a joint intersection,
i.e. it is possible that the debt targeting rule cannot be implemented under all three
instruments with a common set of feedback coeﬃcients.
Before we further operationalize Proposition 3 by linking it explicitly to the level
of steady state debt bgr, we oﬀer some intuition by discussing two examples. First,
varying Example 1, we choose a parametrization which leads to a golden rule steady
state with a ‘small’ debt ratio of 0.02.18 To this end, by lowering α, Example 2
chooses a slightly higher wage income share which raises eﬀectively the propensity
to save out of total income. This structural variation is suﬃcient to shift the economy
to a golden rule steady state:19
Example 2: Consider Example 1, but let α =0 .2,η= −θ =3 .16,g=4 .46.
Assuming b =0 , one obtains R =1 .76 < 1+n =2 .43. At the golden rule steady
18To put this number into perspective it should be stressed that throughout the paper government
debt is expressed as net debt.
19Moreover, to allow for comparability with Example 1, we adjust the levels of η, θ and g such
that the corresponding ratios in terms of income are the same as in Example 1.
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k =1 .3,y=1 5 .8 and a debt ratio of bgr/y =0 .02. Moreover, g/y =0 .28,η / y=0 .2,
θ/y = −0.2, i.e. agents have a relative tax burden in both periods as in Example 1.
Figure 2 illustrates the stability regions associated with all three instruments for
Example 2. By construction, the second benchmark discussed in Section 2 with
coordinates πb = πk =0lies outside all three instrument-speciﬁc stability regions.
Moreover, reﬂecting the low level of debt, Figure 2 shares with Figure 1c the feature
that the three regions have a common intersection.20
Alternatively, Example 3 varies Example 1 by allowing for a more substantial in-
crease in savings through structural factors (by further lowering α and by raising the
savings rate via a higher value of β) as well as policy-related factors (by considering
a tax-transfer system which shifts the tax burden more strongly to second period
income). In sum, this leads to a substantially higher steady-state debt ratio of 0.14.
Example 3: Consider Example 1, but let now α =0 .15 and β =1(i.e. sw =
β/(φ + β)=1 /2). Moreover, η =0 .74,θ= −6.63,g=3 .47. Assuming b =0 , one
obtains R =0 .32 < 1+n =2 .43. At the golden rule steady state, R =1+n =2 .43,
yielding bgr =2 .11 > 0,k=0 .89,y=1 4 .74 and a debt ratio of bgr/y =0 .14.
Moreover, g/y =0 .24,η / y=0 .05,θ / y= −0.45, i.e. the tax burden of agents in the
second period is now substantially higher than in the ﬁrst.
Figure 3 illustrates the stability regions associated with all three instruments for
Example 3. The key result to be inferred from Figure 3 says that at suﬃciently
high debt level the three instrument-speciﬁc stability regions may no longer have
a common intersection.21 More speciﬁcally, for the particular functional forms and
baseline parameter values used in Example 3 the two stability regions associated
with variations in gt and ηt cease to have a common intersection as bgr exceeds
some threshold value.22 This ﬁnding reﬂects that the high interest rate eﬀect on
20However, as far as the region associated with variations in gt is concerned, there is one im-
portant diﬀerence with Figure 1c. Since the interest rate eﬀect on debt is now a key margin of
instability, stabilization in Figure 2 can always be achieved if the primary surplus exclusively re-
acts to the capital stock imbalance, i.e. if πb =0local stability is always ensured for some values
πk < 0. By contrast, if the primary surplus exclusively reacts to the debt imbalance (i.e. if πk =0 )
stabilization can only be achieved if debt is low (like in Example 2).This holds no longer true in a
high debt regime (Example 3), indicating the implementability problems if debt is high.
21When interpreting the parameter values related to the eﬀective savings rate in Examples 1−3
one should recall that the model set-up, counterfactually, does not allow for bequest motives.
Hence, in every period all assets need to be reﬁnanced out of the savings of young agents.
22T h ef a c tt h a ti nF i g u r e3 o n es i d eo ft h et h eη-triangle (corresponding to p(−1)|η =0 )f a l l s
exactly onto a demarcation line of the θ-type stability region (corresponding to p(−1)|θ =0 )i sn o t
generic but caused by the particular numerical assumption β =1( i.e. sw =1 ) , as one can verify
from the conditions stated in Appendix 1. If β<1,p (−1)|η =0slopes upward, while p(−1)|θ =0
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tion equations under the gt-regime and the ηt-regime. For an intuitive explanation,
it helps to realize that, compared with Figure 2, the stability triangle associated
with the ηt-regime in Figure 3 has shifted to the southeast of the stability triangle
associated with the gt-regime. Under the gt-regime points to the southeast of the
gt-triangle have one unstable eigenvalue. For the sake of the argument consider an
initial constellation with b0 >b gr and k0 <k .Then, under the gt-regime for feed-
back coeﬃcients to the southeast of the gt-triangle there is, for given savings, too
much stabilization of debt dynamics, i.e. there is too little emission of new bonds
bt+1. This implies that the composition of next period’s assets (kt+1+bt+1) becomes
too productive, relative to the capacity of the economy to absorb investments in
capital. However, points to the southeast of the gt-triangle may nevertheless be
consistent with fully stabilizing dynamics under the ηt-regime. The reason for this
is that under the ηt- r e g i m et o t a ls a v i n g sw i l lb el o w e rb e c a u s eo ft h et a xb u r d e n
imposed on young agents. Because of this there is less scope that a strong reduction
of bt+1 can trigger ‘overinvestment’ in physical capital kt+1. This reasoning shows
that the instrument-speciﬁc reactions to imbalances may not only be diﬀerent, but
also mutually exclusive if one wishes to maintain over time the knife-edge portfo-
lio composition between government bonds and physical capital at the golden rule
steady state.
If one attempts to make the role of the steady-state level of debt in Proposition 3
more precise one faces the challenge that bgr, in general, is a function of both struc-
tural and policy parameters. In the simple example economy introduced above, the
sets corresponding to these two types of parameters amount to S ={α,β,φ,n,z,δ}
and P ={η,θ,g}. From a policy perspective, it seems preferable to isolate imple-
mentability problems which can be cured by policy changes. To control for this
aspect requires to keep the structural parameters ﬁxed and to look only at those
variations in bgr which are policy-induced. For any set S consistent with the ex-
istence of a golden rule steady state it is possible to increase steady-state debt by
shifting the tax burden more strongly to second period income. Yet, the maximum
amount of debt that can be achieved with such a policy experiment depends itself
on S and this debt level may not always be high enough to prevent the existence of a
debt targeting rule which ensures implementability under all three instruments. This
non-trivial interaction between structural and policy parameters is acknowledged in
Proposition 4. A fairly tractable discussion of this interaction can be achieved by
variations of the example economy, as shown in Appendix 1. Hence, to make the role
of bgr in Proposition 3 more operational, Proposition 4 draws directly on properties
of the example economy.
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acterized by F(K,L)=zKαL1−α and U(c, d)=φlnc + β lnd. Then, at any golden
rule steady state the per capita debt level bgr > 0 is a function of both structural pa-
rameters S ={α,β,φ,n,z,δ}a n dp o l i c yp a r a m e t e r sP ={η,θ,g}. Consider golden
rule steady states which are characterized by the same set S, but diﬀerent policy-
induced debt levels bgr because of diﬀerences in the set P. Then, many (although not
all conceivable) sets of S have the property that the debt targeting rule cannot be
implemented under all three instruments if bgr exceeds some policy-induced threshold
value b∗
gr > 0.
Proof: F o rap r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s3 and 4, see Appendix 1.
4E x t e n s i o n s
4.1 Alternative representations of the debt targeting rule
It is worth pointing out that there exist alternative representations of the debt
targeting rule which lead to the same results summarized in Propositions 1−4. We
consider two particularly intuitive alternatives. As a starting point, we repeat the
ﬂow budget constraint of the government
(1 + n) · bt+1 = R(kt) · bt − πt,
and maintain the assumption that at the steady states under consideration the
primary balance is zero, i.e. πt =0 .
First, let us assume that the debt targeting rule is now expressed in terms of stabi-
lizing reactions of the overall deﬁcit ∆t (i.e. inclusive interest payments), using
(1 + n) · bt+1 = bt + ∆t,
∆t = ∆(kt,b t)=( R(kt) − 1) · bt − πt
Note that the deﬁcit ∆t, at any moment in time, consists of a predetermined com-
ponent linked to interest payments on debt, and a policy component linked to the
primary balance. Only the latter part can actively react to the two predetermined
states of the economy, bt and kt. Accordingly, a debt targeting rule with stabilizing
reactions of the deﬁcit to the states of the economy, in linearized form, needs to be
established from
(1 + n) · dbt+1 = ∆k · dkt +( 1+∆b) · dbt, (28)
with : ∆k = R
0(k) · b − πk, and ∆b = R(k) − 1 − πb. (29)
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which were derived above for the three instruments. Using (28) as the second equa-
tion in these 3 systems and replacing πk and πb by the terms R0(k) · b − ∆k and
R(k)−1−∆b in the ﬁrst equation of the 3 systems, respectively, these systems can
be transformed into three new systems, all exhibiting two-dimensional dynamics in
kt and bt. However, since R(k),R 0(k), and b are all evaluated at constant steady-
state values, the switch from the representation in πb−πk−space to a representation
in ∆b − ∆k−space amounts to an aﬃne transformation, which leaves the results of
Propositions 1 − 4 unaﬀected.
Second, the debt targeting rule can be reinterpreted as a rule which expresses the
issuance of new per capita debt directly in terms of stabilizing reactions to the states
of the economy, according to
(1 + n) · bt+1 = ht, (30)
ht = h(kt,b t)=R(kt) · bt − πt.
After linearizing (30) and substituting out the relevant terms in the three systems,
it is clear that a switch from a representation in πb−πk−space to a representation in
hb −hk−space amounts to another aﬃne transformation, leaving, again, the results
of Propositions 1 − 4 unaﬀected.
4.2 Endogenous labour supply and distortionary taxes
The purpose of this subsection is to show that all the central ﬁndings of Section 3,
as summarized by Propositions 1 −4, prevail qualitatively in a richer setting which
is characterized by an endogenous labour supply and distortionary taxes. Yet, there
is an interesting twist to the results of this richer setting which is worth pointing
out. To this end, we assume now that preferences are described by the more general
expression
U(ct − ϕ(lt),d t+1),
where lt denotes the variable labour supply of the representative young agent and
the function ϕ(lt) captures the disutility of work, with ϕ(0) > 0, and ϕ0(lt) > 0,
ϕ00(lt) > 0 for all lt > 0. As discussed in Greenwood et al. (1988), this labour supply
speciﬁcation has the convenient feature that it can be solved independently from the
intertemporal consumption and savings decisions, allowing for easy comparability
with the analysis of the previous section. Moreover, also for simple comparability, it
is assumed that total tax revenues have a lump-sum and a distortionary component
ηt = η + τtwtlt, (31)
where τt denotes the wage income tax rate. We maintain the assumption that for the
steady-state tax-transfer system, characterized by g ≡ η− θ
1+n, only lump-sum taxes
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adjustment burden falls on variations of the distortionary component τt, whenever
tax adjustments are the preferred instrument to stabilize the debt level around the
steady-state target. Accordingly, the objective can be replaced by
U(wtlt − ϕ(lt) − ηt − st,R t+1st + θt+1),
giving rise to the pair of ﬁrst order conditions
ϕ
0(lt)=( 1 − τt)wt (32)
U1 = Rt+1U2. (33)
With an endogenous labour supply, the labour market equilibrium condition be-
comes Lt = ltNt and the ﬁrst-order conditions from the proﬁt maximization of ﬁrms
are given by
Rt =1 − δ + FK(kt,l t) (34)
wt = FL(kt,l t). (35)
Combining (31), (32), and (35) yields
ltϕ
0(lt)=ltFL(kt,l t) − (ηt − η),
which implicitly deﬁnes the equilibrium labour supply
lt = l(kt,η t)
in the vicinity of some steady state l = l(k,η), with partial derivatives lk(k,η)=
FLK(k,l)
ϕ00(l)−FLL(k,l) > 0 and lη(k,η)= −1
l·[ϕ00(l)−FLL(k,l)] < 0.23 To keep the structure of the
analysis as similar as possible to Section 2,w ed e ﬁne the adjusted gross wage income
net of the disutility term ϕ(lt) as
e wt ≡ wtlt − ϕ(lt)=FL(kt,l t) · lt − ϕ(lt)=e w(kt,η t). (36)
Using (36), the savings function reduces to
















, i.e. in the latter case the derivative is taken with respect to ηt and then
evaluated at the steady state characterized by ηt = η.
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with Section 2 if one expresses the factor prices in terms of the ‘adjusted return
rates’
Rt =1 − δ + FK(kt,l t)=R(kt,ηt)
e wt = e w(kt,ηt).
In particular, Rt falls in kt,a n de wt rises in kt, since24









Rη = FKL · lη < 0 (39)
e wη = l · FLL · lη > 0, (40)
i.e. the adjusted return rates move upon a change in the distortionary labour tax
in diﬀerent directions, reﬂecting that the labour supply itself falls in η.25 Then, the
set of intertemporal equilibrium conditions can be summarized as







(1 + n)bt+1 = R(kt,η t)bt − πt (42)




The system (41)-(43) is structurally similar to the system (4)-(6) discussed in the
previous section. Speciﬁcally, let
A
∗





2 = sw e wk > 0
24To establish (37) we exploit FKK · FLL =( FKL)2 which follows from the linear homogeneity
assumption made in (A 4).
25Note that Rη < 0 implies that the gross wage rate w = FL(k,l) rises in ηt, i.e. wη = FLL·lη >
0. To see why the adjusted wage term e w satisﬁes e wη > 0 note ﬁrst that the gross wage bill
(wl) falls in ηt, despite the rise in w, if the wage elasticity of employment is larger than one.
However, the disutility of labour decreases because of the reduced labour supply, and the latter
eﬀect always dominates, ensuring e wη > 0. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the net wage
rate (1 − τt)w = w − (ηt − η)/l, evaluated at the steady state, falls in ηt, since wη − 1/l < 0 if
−FLL/[ϕ00(l) − FLL] < 1, and the latter inequality must always be satisﬁed.
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1 >A ∗
2. Then, in the light of (37) and (38), dynamics remain qual-
itatively unchanged for variations in gt and θt+1, since ηt will be held constant in
these two scenarios. If, however, adjustments in the primary balance are achieved
via distortionary wage income taxes, as embodied in ηt, the dynamic system behaves
qualitatively diﬀerently from Section 3 because of the additional partial eﬀects re-
sulting from (39) and (40). The key diﬀerence is that variations in the wage income
tax aﬀect the labour supply and, hence, the (pre-tax) factor return rates. As indi-
cated by (39) and (40), the reduced labour supply decreases the equilibrium interest
factor Rt and increases both the wage rate wt and the adjusted wage term e wt. This
feature implies that the distortionary wage income tax acts in terms of factor prices
like a built-in-stabilizer which moderates the destabilizing interest rate eﬀect on
debt. In other words, whenever wage income taxes are changed to address unsta-
b l ed e b td y n a m i c st h i sh a st h ec o n v e n i e n ti m p l i c a t i o nt h a tt h ei n t e r e s tr a t ee ﬀect
on debt will be endogenously dampened through the mechanics of the factor-price
frontier, assuming competitive factor markets and an elastic labour supply. As we
show in the ﬁnal two subsections, this feature does not aﬀect the assessment of un-
deraccumulation steady states, but it somewhat moderates the assessment of golden
rule steady states.
To conclude this subsection, it is worth pointing out that this analysis equiva-
lently (and probably more naturally) could have been carried out in terms of state-
contingent variations of the direct tax instrument τt, using
τt = τk(kt − k)+τb(bt − b),
with associated values πk = τkwl and πb = τbwl in the linearized budget constraint,
evaluated at the steady-state value τ =0 . The instead considered variations in tax
revenues ηt take implicitly the reaction of the labour supply to changes in τt into
account, allowing for easy comparability with the set-up introduced in Section 3.
In any case, with τt and ηt evaluated at their respective steady-state values, one
can show that the linearized dynamic systems are identical for the two approaches.
Hence, none of the results depends on this notational choice.
4.2.1 Underaccumulation steady state
At any underaccumulation steady state the interest rate eﬀe c to nd e b ti sz e r oa n dt h e
moderation of factor prices under the ηt-regime is therefore, qualitatively, without
consequence for the structure of the dynamic system. Recall from Section 3.1. that
ηt = e η(kt,b t)=η + πk(kt − k)+πb(bt − b),
with e ηk = πk and e ηb = πb. Appendix 2 summarizes for all three instruments key
features of the linearized dynamic equations. Because of the structural similarities
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can be entirely inferred from the linearized version of (42)
(1 + n) · dbt+1 =[ ( Rk + Rηπk)b − πk] · dkt +[ R(k) − πb + Rηπbb] · dbt, (44)
using e ηk = πk and e ηb = πb. Since b =0 , (44) turns under the particular assumption





Hence, for all three instruments gt, ηt,a n dθt+1 the two eigenvalues of the respective









if one assumes πk =0 . Because of this feature, the classiﬁcation of dynamic equilibria
under the three instruments is as in Section 3.1 and Propositions 1 and 2 remain
unaﬀected.
4.2.2 Golden rule steady state
At any golden rule steady state, Proposition 3 of Section 3.2 remains valid, but
the stabilizing reactions of factor prices under the ηt- r e g i m em a k ei ti nac e r t a i n
sense less likely that the instrument-speciﬁc sets of stable feedback coeﬃcients πk
and πb have no joint intersection. To operationalize this insight, it is convenient to
reconsider the example economy used so far with a more general preference structure.
Speciﬁcally, let





t ]+β lndt+1, (45)
where χ>0 denotes the inverse of the constant elasticity of the labour supply. As
shown in Appendix 2, when combined with a Cobb-Douglas production function,
(45) implies for the two crucial partial eﬀe c t so nr e t u r nr a t e s( 3 9 )a n d( 4 0 ) :











where α ∈ (0,1) denotes the Cobb-Douglas share of capital. Evidently, the para-
meter χ is of key importance for the reactions of the factor prices to changes in η.
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omy behaves qualitatively like the benchmark scenario discussed in Section 3, since
Rη → 0 and e wη → 0. For illustration, Example 4 sets χ =1 0 0 0and uses numerical
values for the other parameters which reproduce Example 3, i.e. the gt-regime and
the ηt-regime have no common intersection in terms of stabilizing feedback coeﬃ-
cients. By contrast, Example 5 drops the assumption of an inelastic labour supply
and uses instead a much lower value of χ =2 .
Example 4: F(K,L)=zKαL1−α,U (c, l, d,)=φln[c −
ξ
1+χl1+χ]+β lnd.
χ =1 0 0 0 ,δ=1 ,z=1 5 ,α=0 .15,φ=1 ,β=1 ,R=1+n =2 .43. Moreover,
η =0 .74,θ= −6.63,g=3 .46, implying bgr =2 .11 > 0,k=0 .88,y=1 4 .72,
bgr/y =0 .14,g / y=0 .24,η / y=0 .05,θ / y= −0.45. The ‘free’ parameter ξ is set at
ξ =3 0 , normalizing the labour supply to l =1 .
Example 5: Consider Example 4, but let χ =2 . We maintain g/y =0 .24,η / y=
0.05,θ / y= −0.45. Everything else being equal, this implies: R =1+n =2 .43,
bgr =0 .81 > 0,k=0 .57,y=9 .54,b gr/y =0 .08,l=0 .6.
Figures 4 and 5 show for the two example economies the stability regions associated
with all three instruments. The key ﬁnding is that under the elastic labour supply
of Example 5 the stability triangle of the ηt-regime is no longer strictly to the
southeast of the gt−triangle, but allows instead for a common intersection. In other
words, Figures 4 and 5 illustrate that under distortionary wage income taxes there
is scope for stabilizing reactions of factor prices which moderate the strong results
of Propositions 3 and 4.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies the stabilization of government debt dynamics under a number
of diﬀerent ﬁscal instruments from a comparative perspective. Speciﬁcally, the pa-
per addresses the question of whether a state contingent debt targeting rule which
links the stabilization of long-run debt to the underlying state of the economy can
be implemented under all available ﬁscal instruments with a common set of feed-
back coeﬃcients. Using a fully tractable overlapping generations framework, the
main analytical result of the paper says that the answer to this question cannot
be given without reference to the level of long-run debt around which the economy
is stabilized. Intuitively, this ﬁnding reﬂects that diﬀerent ﬁscal instruments (like
government spending, public transfers, and the menu of available taxes) aﬀect the
economy through instrument-speciﬁc margins which are associated with diﬀerent
distortions (related, for example, to the labour-leisure decision, investment deci-
sions, or consumption decisions). The steady-state level of debt to be stabilized
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As the level of debt rises the importance of these distinct margins increases, implying
that for any particular debt targeting rule the instrument-speciﬁc adjustment paths
become increasingly diverse. Exploiting this feature, the paper shows that there can
easily exist a threshold value of long-run debt beyond which the instrument-speciﬁc
adjustment paths become so diverse that there exists no longer a debt targeting rule
which can be implemented under all instruments.
As the paper stands, these results are derived in a deliberately small and fully
tractable model of a closed economy. Yet, the policy implications can probably
best be seen in the context of a monetary union with decentralized ﬁscal policies,
subject to certain provisions of a common ﬁscal framework. The analysis of this
paper does not add any new arguments why such a framework is necessary. Instead,
it indicates that within any such framework high levels of average debt are likely
to create tensions between the necessary provisions of a common framework which
tracks deﬁcit developments and the unrestricted choice of ﬁscal instruments at the
national level. This paper implicitly assumes that the latter feature is by itself
of considerable value. Therefore, if one wishes to preserve this value under the
conditions of a monetary union the results of this paper indicate that the union’s
ﬁscal framework should be organized around a suﬃciently ambitious target level of
debt. We leave it for future work to further explore this mechanism, also with a
focus on quantitative issues, within a modelling framework that explicitly allows for
features which are characteristic of a set-up with multiple countries.
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Appendix 1: Fixed labour supply and lump sum
taxes
Preliminaries to the proofs of Propositions 2 − 4:
For further reference, we derive for the three instruments the characteristic polyno-
mials p(λ)i and the critical stability conditions p(1)|i =0 ,p (−1)|i =0 ,p (0)|i =1 ,
for: i = g,η,θ.
1) Regarding gt, the characteristic equation associated with (18) and (19) satisﬁes
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
A2 − A1λ −(1 + n)λ
R0(k)b − πk R(k) − πb − (1 + n)λ











































2) Regarding ηt, the characteristic equation associated with (22) and (23) satisﬁes
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
A2 − swπk − A1λ −swπb − (1 + n)λ
R0(k)b − πk R(k) − πb − (1 + n)λ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ =0 , i.e.
p(λ)|η = p(λ)|g + sw
πk
A1




p(0)|η = p(0)|g + sw ·
R0(k)bπb − R(k)πk
A1(1 + n)
p(1)|η = p(1)|g + sw ·
R0(k)bπb +[ ( 1+n) − R(k)]πk
A1(1 + n)
p(−1)|η = p(−1)|g + sw ·
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¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
A2 − [A1 − (1 − sw)
(1+n)πk
R ] · λ −[1 + n − (1 − sw)
(1+n)πb
R ] · λ
R0(k)b − πk R(k) − πb − (1 + n)λ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ =0
Let e A1 = A1 − (1 − sw) 1+n
R(k)πk. Note that e A1 = A1 if πk =0 . Then:
p(λ)|θ = λ











(1 − sw) 1+n
R(k)πb(R0(k)b − πk)
e A1(1 + n)
θ2 =
A2









e A1(1 + n)
πb




























Proof of proposition 2:
Consider Figure 1c. Then, independent of the particular functional forms underlying
Example 1, the stability constraints at the underaccumulation steady state with
R(k) > 1+n and b =0satisfy:
i) If πk =0 , then p(0)|g = p(0)|η = p(0)|θ =1jointly intersect at πb,0 = R(k) −
(1 + n)A1/A2.I f πk =0 , then p(1)|g = p(1)|η = p(1)|θ =0jointly intersect at
πb,1 = R(k) − (1 + n) >π b,0. If πk =0 , then p(−1)|g = p(−1)|η = p(−1)|θ =0
jointly intersect at πb,−1 = R(k)+( 1+n) >π b,1.
ii) p(0)|g =1is vertical in πb − πk−space. Moreover, p(0)|η =1slopes downward
and p(0)|θ =1slopes upward, since




p(0)|θ =1 ⇔ πk =
R(k)










iii) p(1)|g =0 ,p (1)|η =0 ,p (1)|θ =0all slope upward in πb − πk−space, with
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θ=0 , since







p(1)|η =0 ⇔ πk =
(A1 − A2)(1 + n − R(k))
(1 − sw)(1 + n)+swR(k)
+
A1 − A2
(1 − sw)(1 + n)+swR(k)
πb
p(1)|θ =0 ⇔ πk =
(A1 − A2)R(k)(1 −
R(k)
1+n)





(1 − sw)(1 + n)+swR(k)
πb
Then, combining i) with the slope conditions established in ii) and iii) implies that
for each of the three instruments there exist stabilizing feedback coeﬃcients πk and
πb which lie outside the stability regions of the other two instruments. ¤
Proof of propositions 3 and 4:
The proof considers, for simplicity, only the g-regime and the η-regime and shows
for a particularly tractable example that the intersection of the two stability regions
becomes empty if the golden rule level of steady-state debt exceeds some policy-
induced threshold value b∗
gr > 0. Speciﬁcally, a constellation is derived where
i) p(0)|η < 1, ii) p(1)|η > 0, and iii) p(−1)|g > 0 (49)
are not jointly satisﬁed. For easy reference, consider Figure 6 which plots the three
conditions at equality. Let F(K,L)=zKαL1−α and, assuming φ =0 , let U(c,
d)=l n d, implying that all disposable wage income is saved, i.e. sw =1 . Hence,
steady-state savings conveniently satisfy






= w − η =( 1− α) · zk
α − η.
Let δ =1 ,z>0,n>0,α∈ (0,1) and assume g>0, with g in steady state
being calibrated such that g = gs · zkα. Similarly, let η b e i n gc a l i b r a t e ds u c ht h a t
η = ηs · zkα. Assume, without any further restriction, gs ∈ (0,1). Then, feasibility
implies ηs ∈ (0,1−α), and θ can be recursively obtained from θ =( 1+n)(η −g).26
In line with the main text, let S ={α,β,φ,n,z,δ}a n dP ={η,θ,g}. We derive
subsequently three critical conditions purely in terms of the variables α ∈ S and
η ∈ P.27 The three conditions, when jointly satisﬁed, are suﬃcient to ensure that
26If gs ∈ (0,α) the lower bound of ηs can be made negative (and maximum debt higher),
contingent on gs. Then, both η and g would enter the critical conditions derived below, without
aﬀecting, however, the logic of the proof.
27At the expense of considerably more tedious algebra it is straightforward to extend the proof to
the more general utility function U(c, d)=φlnc+β lnd, with φ>0 and sw = β/(φ+β) ∈ (0,1),
thereby enlarging the number of critical variables in the set S. In any case, assuming φ =0the
following analysis indicates that (A 1) and (A 2) in Section 2 a c to n l ya sw i d e l yu s e dsuﬃcient
conditions that need not to be satisﬁed for the existence of a golden rule steady state.
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of the two stability regions becomes empty if the level of steady-state debt exceeds
ap o l i c y - i n d u c e dt h r e s h o l dv a l u eb∗
gr > 0.
Step 1) Consider a steady state with b =0and k>0, satisfying
k =
(1 − α)zkα − η
1+n
=
(1 − α − ηs)zkα
1+n
⇔ k =[





A golden rule steady state satisﬁes
1+n = R(kgr)=αzk
α−1






At any such steady state, the output level is independent of the set P. Hence,
variations in ηs lead one-to-one to variations in η. Moreover, bgr > 0 at the golden





1 − 2α − ηs
α
) · kgr =(








Evidently, for a given set S the level of bgr declines in ηs, i.e. a more front-loaded
funding of g via higher ηs reduces savings and thereby bgr. For further reference,
R0(kgr)·bgr =( 1 + n)
(α−1)
α (1−2α−ηs),A 1 =1 + n, and A2 = w0(kgr)=( 1 + n)(1−α).
To sum up, combined with the feasibility condition, a golden rule steady state with
bgr > 0 exists if
ηs ∈ (0,1 − 2α), (50)
and the upper bound of bgr can be calculated as bgr =( 1−2α
α ) · kgr.
Step 2) Consider Figure 6. We derive a condition which ensures that both p(0)|η =
1 and p(1)|η =0slope downward in πb− πk−space and have an intersection with
coordinates π∗∗
b > 0 and π∗∗
k < 0. From the preliminaries to the proofs, using sw =1 ,
one obtains
p(1)|η > 0 ⇔ πk <R
0(kgr) · bgr +






0(kgr) · bgr < 0











k denote the intercepts if πb =0 , respectively. Evidently, p(0)|η =1
slopes always downward in πb− πk−space, while p(1)|η =0slopes downward if
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b = A2 − A1 − R


























k ⇔− α(1 + n) > (1 + n)
(α − 1)
α
(1 − 2α − ηs)
⇔ α
2 − 3α +1− ηs(1 − α) > 0 (51)




Step 3) Finally, building on step 2, we derive a condition which ensures that parts
i) and ii) of (49) and part iii) cannot be jointly satisﬁed. Using the notation of
Figure 6, if π∗
k(π∗∗
b ) >π ∗∗
k (π∗∗
b ) the intersection of p(0)|η =1and p(1)|η =0is to the
southeast of p(−1)|g =0 , since the latter equation slopes upward in πb− πk−space.
To see this, note that
p(−1)|g > 0 ⇔ πk >R




Moreover, combining the expressions as inequalities implies that parts i) and ii) of
(49) and part iii) cannot be jointly satisﬁed if π∗
k(π∗∗
b ) >π ∗∗
k (π∗∗
b ). To establish this





0(kgr) · bgr − 2(A1 + A2)+
A1 + A2
1+n
(A2 − A1 − R
0(kgr)bgr),
and by comparing the two terms one obtains π∗
k(π∗∗

















Inserting the steady-state relations derived above, one obtains π∗
k(π∗∗








α2 − 3α +1− ηs(1 − α)
α
> 2·(2−α). (52)
Using η = ηs · ygr, all three critical conditions (50), (51), (52) are solely expressed
in terms of the variables α ∈ S and η ∈ P. By combining them appropriately it is
possible to prove Propositions 3 and 4. To this end, we show that for a broad range
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appropriate variations in η. Speciﬁcally, consider 0 <α<α<1/2, with the critical
bound α being derived below. Then, there exists a unique η∗
s(α) ∈ (0,1−2α) which is
associated with a unique b∗
gr ∈ (0,bgr) such that the golden rule steady state cannot
be implemented under all three instruments if ηs ∈ (0,η∗
s(α)) ⇔ bgr ∈ (b∗
gr,bgr). To
derive α we address (51) and (52) in turn.
First, consider condition (51). Assume ηs =0 . Then, considering α ∈ (0,1/2),
condition (51) as a strict equality is satisﬁed by a unique α1 =0 .382 and (51) holds
for any α ∈ (0,α1). The LHS of (51) falls in ηs and condition (51) deﬁnes for any
α ∈ (0,α1) a unique upper bound ηs(α) ∈ (0,1 − 2α).
Second, consider condition (52). Assume ηs =0 . Then, considering α ∈ (0,α1),
condition (52) as a strict equality is satisﬁed by a unique α =0 .254 and (52) holds
for any α ∈ (0,α). The LHS of (52) falls in ηs and condition (52) deﬁnes for any
α ∈ (0,α) a unique upper bound η∗
s(α) ∈ (0,ηs(α)), implying η∗
s(α) ∈ (0,1 − 2α).
Finally, from this reasoning it is clear that the implementability of the debt targeting
rule under all three instruments even under high policy-induced debt levels may not
be a problem for all sets S. If α ∈ (α,1/2) then the upper bound of ηs deﬁned in
(51) and (52) can never be larger than the lower bound of zero deﬁned in (50). ¤
Appendix 2: Endogenous labour supply and dis-
tortionary taxes
Key features of the linearized dynamics under all three instruments:
As derived in the main text, consider the equations (41)-(43)
(1 + n)(kt+1 + bt+1)=s(e w(kt,η t) − ηt +
θt+1
R(kt+1,ηt+1)
,R (kt+1,η t+1)) −
θt+1
R(kt+1,η t+1)
(1 + n)bt+1 = R(kt,ηt)bt − πt







2 = sw e wk. For variations in gt and
θt+1 the taxation term ηt will be held constant. Hence, because of the structural
similarity to the analysis given in Appendix 1, it is clear that the characteristic

































































Regarding ηt, the linearized dynamics, similar to (18) and (19) and by using ηk = πk
and ηb = πb, can be summarized as
(A
∗
1 − ψ1πk) · dkt+1 +( 1+n − ψ1πb) · dbt+1 =( A
∗
2 + ψ2πk) · dkt + ψ2πb · dbt
ψ1 = Rη[sR +( 1− sw)
θ
R(k)2]
ψ2 = sw(e wη − 1)
(1 + n) · dbt+1 =[ ( Rk + Rηπk)b − πk] · dkt +[ R(k) − πb + Rηπbb] · dbt,















R(k) − πb + Rηπbb
1+n
−
[(Rk + Rηπk)b − πk](1 + n − ψ1πb)
(A∗





2 + ψ2πk)[R(k) − πb + Rηπbb] − [(Rk + Rηπk)b − πk]ψ2πb
(A∗
1 − ψ1πk)(1 + n)
.
Note that (53) reduces to (48) if Rη =0(and, hence, ψ1 =0)a n de wη =0and if
one replaces A∗
1 and A∗
2 by A1 and A2.
Derivation of (46) and (47):
Consider ϕ(l)=
ξ
1+χl1+χ, with ϕ0(l)=ξlχ. At the steady state, w = ϕ0(l), since
τt =0 . Hence, e w = lϕ0(l) − ϕ(l)=ξ
χ
1+χl1+χ. Using lη(k,η)= −1
l·[ϕ00(l)−FLL(k,l)] < 0,
(39) and (40) turn into:
Rη = FKL · lη =
−FKL(k,l)
l · [ϕ00(l) − FLL(k,l)]
< 0




Consider F(K,L)=zKαL1−α, with FL(k,l)=z(1−α)kαl−α. Using the steady-state
relationship ϕ0(l)=w = FL(k,l) one obtains upon diﬀerentiation, Rη = − α
α+χ · 1
k
and e wη = α
α+χ ∈ (0,1). ¤
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January 2006Figure 1a: Underaccumulation steady state
Stability triangle associated with gt−regime (example 1)

















R(k)+1+n  R(k)−(1+n) 
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January 2006Figure 1b: Underaccumulation steady state
Adjustment paths under gt−regime for diﬀerent feedback coeﬃcients (example 1)
B:d a s h e d ( b l u e ) l i n e
C: solid (black) line
D: dashed-dotted (red) line
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January 2006Figure 1c: Underaccumulation steady state
Stability regions for all three instruments (example 1)
Shaded area: common intersection
gt−regime: solid (green) line
ηt−regime: dashed (blue) line
θt+1−regime: dashed-dotted (red) line
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January 2006Figure 2: Golden rule steady state
Stability regions for all three instruments (example 2)
Shaded area: common intersection
gt−regime: solid (green) line
ηt−regime: dashed (blue) line
θt+1−regime: dashed-dotted (red) line
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January 2006Figure 3: Golden rule steady state
Stability regions for all three instruments (example 3)
gt−regime: solid (green) line
ηt−regime: dashed (blue) line
θt+1−regime: dashed-dotted (red) line
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January 2006Figure 4: Golden rule steady state under distortionary taxation
Stability regions for all three instruments (example 4)
gt−regime: solid (green) line
ηt−regime: dashed (blue) line
θt+1−regime: dashed-dotted (red) line
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January 2006Figure 5: Golden rule steady state under distortionary taxation
Stability regions for all three instruments (example 5)
Shaded area: common intersection
gt−regime: solid (green) line
ηt−regime: dashed (blue) line
θt+1−regime: dashed-dotted (red) line
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January 2006Figure 6: Golden rule steady state
Empty intersection of gt−triangle and ηt−triangle (Proof of Proposition 3)
gt−regime: solid (green) line
ηt−regime: dashed (blue) line
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